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ABSTRACT
Growth in costs and schedules of aerospace 
projects is all too commonplace. Within NASA, 
about 70% of cost growth is attributed to under­ 
estimation of technical difficulty, 20% to major 
scope changes and 10% to external impacts. 
Schedule duration has increased by 50% over the 
last 15 years. Most growth problems can be 
traced to incomplete Phase A/B requirements 
definition, coupled with the resulting incom­ 
plete cost estimates.
NLS must be a cost effective, low cost transporta­ 
tion system to be viable. To achieve this goal a 
cost containment system is required which forces 
cost, technical and schedule to function'together 
interlocked in a controlled management system.
INTRODUCTION
Cost growth in aerospace programs seems to be 
the norm these days. Hardly a week goes by 
without some news article detailing a horror 
story on a space project involving large cost 
growth and schedule slips, often coupled with 
poor technical performance and perhaps even a 
hint of an attempted cover-up of the matter. 
These stories imply NASA, DOD and aerospace 
contractors can not or will not manage their 
resources effectively.
A recent study by the Federation of American 
Scientists indicates the average space project cost 2 
1/2 times as much as promised and was 58% behind 
schedule. My data base generally supports these 
factors, however, much depends on what is
considered to be the initial estimate. Some pro­ 
grams are tracked against the initial contract value, 
others from the congressional commitment made 
at the time the program is approved, and others 
to early Phase A and Phase B estimates.
Anyway, many of these accusations of large cost 
growths are all too true. Aerospace "new start" 
program managers seem to eternally believe they 
can do the impossible in providing high tech 
products in record time at garage sale prices. 
Nevermind that similar programs took twice as 
long and cost twice as much. This time "we are 
going to do it differently", "we will freeze the 
design early and allow no changes", "we will cut 
out the fat", etc. So they say, but somehow in the 
real program execution it never seems to work 
out that way.
Once the program begins, the overzealous claims 
are quickly overtaken by the grim realities of 
program turbulence, technical complexities, in­ 
terfaces, personnel turnover, changing budget 
priorities and emerging requirements. The inevi­ 
table growth in problems, weights, requirements, 
manpower, costs and schedules, coupled with 
reduction in margins, performance and planned 
capabilities has lead to many cost reduction ideas 
and techniques.
None of these "cure alls" really attack the root 
cause of cost growth as we will discuss later. 
Nevertheless, many techniques have come to the 
forefront as cost reduction tools. In fact, it seems 
as though a new one is invented everyday. Some 
of these concepts currently in usage are displayed 
in Figure 1.
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Total Quality Management
Financial Farsightedness
Taquchi Method
Factory of the Future
Design To Cost
Continuous Process Improvement
Technology Advancement
Automation/Robotics
Culture Changes
Quality Functional Deployment
Concurrent Engineering
Skunk Works
Should Cost
Operability Focus
Just-In-Time Delivery
Ship and Shoot
Platform Teams
Figure 1. Samples of Current Cost 
Reduction Concepts
While each of these has cost saving potential, 
they must be pursued vigorously and continu­ 
ally if any actual savings are to materialize. They 
must be undertaken with management convic­ 
tion which lasts throughout the program. None of 
these are easy, some have significant up-front costs, 
most require personnel training and all require con­ 
stant monitoring and evaluation. They represent a 
management commitment to invest in the present 
for greater rewards in the future.
One recent success story was the Upper Atmo­ 
sphere Research Satellite (UARS) which was 
launched this past September and stayed within 
its $630M budget. Program officials offered the 
following reasons for good programmatic per­ 
formance:
1. Use of off-the-shelf hardware
2. Initially planned 4 satellite program re­ 
duced early on to a single satellite launch
3. Spacecraft design based on a design that 
had been used before
4. Interfaces between spacecraft and
instruments known early and remained 
constant
5. Proposed improvements over the basic 
design and capabilities were not accepted.
These reasons could be called TQM or the like, 
but it seems more like common sense and techno­ 
logical conservatism that did the trick and, of 
course, maybe luck.
Other space programs, such as Space Station, 
Earth Observing System (EOS), New Launch Sys­ 
tem (NLS) and Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), 
which initially promised all things to all people 
appear doomed to major down scoping, delayed 
starts and price tags larger than the Congress will 
support. The Space Station's initial technical 
content and advertised $8 billion cost were to­ 
tally incompatible from the start. This has kept 
the program in internal conflict as it has tried to 
do too much with too little. The downsizing and 
program rescoping has cost millions and years 
which could have been more prudently applied 
to a Space Station whose cost and design were 
congruent.
COST GROWTH
Space projects have never been without cost 
growth, but this growth has increased over the 
years in number and percent. Figure 2 indicates 
the average percent cost growth for 20 NASA 
projects launched in the 1970's and for 18 post- 
1980 projects. The judged cost increases associ­ 
ated with the Challenger accident have been 
removed from the applicable projects to normal­ 
ize the data. Major reasons for the cost growth are
(1) underestimate oftheprogram difficulty (complexi­ 
ties, design requirements, interfaces, schedule) 70%,
(2) major scope changes 20%, and (3) external impacts 
(constrained budget, Congress) 10%.
Part of this increase in cost growth is due to a slow 
culture change in NASA. NASA now has much 
less in-house technical capability and has be­ 
come older, more conservative and is less willing 
to accept risk or failure. It has lost the boundless
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Figure 2. Past and Current Cost Growth 
Trends in NASA
enthusiasm and air of excitement that was exhib­ 
ited by its personnel in the 1960s. NASA projects 
are now more encumbered with bureaucratic 
processes, documentation, and reporting systems 
which add cost and manpower. Technology 
advancements have offset these cost increases to 
a degree, but not enough to turn the trend around. 
For example, in today's dollars, the development 
cost of Space Shuttle's SSME engine was about 
30% greater than either of Saturn V's F-l or J-2 
engines. The explanation was that the SSME was 
considerably more technically demanding. Now, 
however, the new STME which purports to be a 
return to a simpler, less technically demanding, 
low cost system is expected to have the same 
development cost as the SSME.
The seemly inevitable aerospace cost growth 
clearly makes the case for adequate program cost
contingencies or reserves. I recently added on a 
major addition to my house. At the outset, I made 
a detailed cost estimate using the best, most 
reliable data possible. After all, people have been 
adding on to their houses for thousands of years 
so the task appeared simple. A line by line 
estimate was compiled using vendor quotes, in­ 
puts from knowledgeable tradespeople, rules of 
thumb and actual hardware prices. To this I 
initially added a 30% cost contingency, but as my 
planning list grew the dollar total exceeded my 
budget so I was forced to cut back contingencies 
to 10%. After the work was complete I compared 
my estimate to the actual costs line by line. As it 
turned out I was extremely close (2-3%) on every 
item which I had estimated. The problem was 
that there were a large number of items required 
which I, at the outset, had no idea I needed and 
had made no estimate for. These more than 
consumed my meager contingency and made for 
an overrun. Fortunately it did not make the 
newspaper headlines.
The point is there is no way to totally quantify the 
unknown. No matter how much you spend in 
planning there will still be unexpected discover­ 
ies in the execution phase. (Incidentally, a later 
Figure will address this point.) The bottom line is 
that a reasonable cost contingency (20-30%) in a 
space program is a must. It is a place holder for the 
unknown. It is not an optional item "which will 
get spent up if you include it" — it will get spent 
regardless! But at dire consequences to the pro­ 
gram if it was not included.
SCHEDULE GROWTH
Aerospace projects also now take considerably 
longer to develop which account for part of the 
increased cost. Figure 3 indicates the enormous 
growth in development time for NASA space­ 
crafts. The schedule slips associated with the 
Challenger accident have been removed from 
this data. Nevertheless, average development time 
has increased by 50% in the past fifteen years. The 
UARS, mentioned earlier, actually was proposed
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in 1978 and took 13 years to gain approval, be 
built and launched — four years longer than it 
took to go to the moon.
Another example of schedule slips and cost 
growth is the Skylab Program Payloads chart 
shown in Figure 4. This actual data is more un­ 
real looking than any hypothetical illustration I 
could have created. The actual cost expenditure 
is plotted along with some 15 NASA Program 
Operating Plan (POP) requirements over time. 
There are several trends here that are typical of 
most space projects. First, in the early years it is 
usually not possible to spend all the money allo­ 
cated because of the delays in getting organized 
and hiring and training personnel. Second, in the 
later part of a program it is easy to over spend 
because of the difficulty of getting people off the 
program. Lastly, the slow ramp-up causes sched­ 
ule stretch out and cost growth.
Figure 3. NASA Development Time Trends
Figure 4. Comparison of NASA POP Requirements to Actual Cost for Skylab Program Payloads
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PRIMARY COST GROWTH CAUSE stage for cost containment. These are:
The causes of cost growth — internal and exter­ 
nal, technical and management, foreseeable and 
totally unforeseeable —are innumerable. But the 
primary root cause, I believe, is incomplete technical 
definition early on. This leads to requirements 
understatement; incomplete and inaccurate cost 
and schedule estimating, and program redi­ 
rection, growth and downsizing as previously 
unknown requirements surface. Figure 5 indi­ 
cates that funds spent in the definition phase can 
have tremendous payoff in total program cost 
savings. This plot, with some 25 NASA data 
points, indicates that if 8-10% of the total pro­ 
gram cost is invested in Phase A/B definition, 
total program growth is held to around 30% 
above the final Phase B estimate. Spending more 
dollars and effort on definition seems to offer 
little payoff, but spending less definitely has a 
very significant impact on the program total cost.
A number of very important actions should oc­ 
cur during the critical definition period to set the
1. Actual user needs are solicited and 
accomodated.
2. Bona fide requirements established.
3. A workable, conservative preliminary 
design developed with margins.
4. A streamlined, astute management struc­ 
ture formulated.
5. A total program plan developed.
6. A realistic and inclusive cost baseline esti­ 
mate made.
If these are done well, the battle for cost containment 
is half won.
The other half of the battle is to (1) resolutely 
maintain this baseline and not to let the better 
become the enemy of the good; (2) establish and 
utilize powerful management systems which pro­ 
vide program status, tracking, control and sound 
basis for timely corrective actions as required; 
and (3) instill within the total government and 
contractor workforce a desire, a will, a motiva­ 
tion to do things right the first time — on time
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Figure 5. NASA Phase A/B Definition Investment versus Program Total Cost Growth from the
Final Phase B Cost Estimate.
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with minimum expenditure of resources. Some 
programs have this technical and management 
pride, this drive for excellence — many do not.
NLS COST CONTAINMENT
Enough background and preaching on causes of 
cost growth. What can be realistically done in the 
NLS program to contain cost and avoid the tur­ 
moil associated with other programs? Already 
there are forces at work which cause the NLS new 
start grief. These include the massive federal 
budget deficit, the severe domestic economic 
recession, the major perturbations of other pro­ 
grams within NASA and DOD, the election year, 
the lack of strong NLS "users'' or proponents, the 
uncertain NLS technical baseline and the already 
advertised $10.7 to $12.2 billion DDT&E cost. 
NLS is being touted as cost-effective and offering 
low cost transportation. In fact, this has become 
a major thrust of the NLS new-start justification 
and these claims must be addressed in a persua­ 
sive and business like manner.
On the one hand, the Space Shuttle is a very 
expensive system to operate and the Titan IV is 
technologically antiquated in many ways. There­ 
fore, it would seem logical that a new system 
could easily beat both of them in cost per flight 
and cost per pound delivered. Especially if that 
new vehicle was, in fact, a system with common 
hardware, facilities, manpower and management 
for a family of vehicles with different payload 
capabilities.
On the other hand, if the new vehicle has de­ 
manding and costly requirements placed on it 
such as engine out, two separate launch com­ 
plexes, engine separation system, advanced avi­ 
onics, Shuttle compatible payload bay, STS heri­ 
tage, man-rateable, etc., then suddenly its com­ 
petitive advantage is greatly diminished. The 
present STS and Titan IV vehicles — costly or 
antiquated as they are — don't require major 
DDT&E money nor are they that inefficient in 
operations cost by comparison to NLS, especially 
if projected launch rates are modest. The STS
operations cost reduction effort, which is now 
underway here and at other NASA centers, is 
intended to reduce STS operations cost 3% per 
year for 5 years or $1.8 billion overall. These 
efficiencies will surely be applicable to NLS as 
well. They also free up money which hopefully 
can be applied to a NLS new start.
W. Edward Denning, the father of TQM, says "If 
you always do what you 've always done, you '// always 
get what you always got/' Clearly we must do 
something different if we are to make NLS a 
reality. For NLS to attain congressional and 
national approval, it must show technical and 
cost advantages over the present launch systems. 
I will leave the technical superiority discussion to 
others and concentrate on the cost justification. 
NLS must be capable of providing low cost trans­ 
portation for payloads and yet achieve this aim 
within a DDT&E budget which will surely be 
constrained both in total and year-by-year costs. 
To fulfill this difficult goal, NASA and the Air Force 
must put major emphasis on cost containment and 
adopt a new development culture where (1) the cost 
impact of every program decision is carefully weighted 
before implementation, (2) where low operating costs 
drive every design trade, and (3) where NLS manage­ 
ment make design and program architecture converge 
on costs rather than vice versa.
I envision a NLS cost containment system which 
would be an interactive process forcing cost, tech­ 
nical and schedule to function together, inter­ 
locked in a controlled and viable management 
system. While "zero cost growth" is not possible, 
"cost containment" within acceptable bounds is 
an achievable management goal. NLS which 
involves many program elements, centers, con­ 
tractors and a NASA/Air Force partnership, has 
unforeseens and unknowns which can not be 
totally anticipated. Even with descoping of tech­ 
nical requirements, schedule adjustments and 
cost contingencies, some cost growth is likely. 
With an integrated cost containment plan fully 
supported by NLS management, such cost growth 
can be minimized and contained. This managed 
containment will permit a viable NLS program to 
proceed in a very cost effective manner.
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STEPS TO NLS COST CONTAINMENT
The proposed cost containment framework con­ 
sists of five key steps as shown in Figure 6.
1. Establish the baseline program.
2. Establish cost targets and contingen­ 
cies.
3. Establish cost containment manage­ 
ment systems.
4. Perform tracking, analyses and evalu­ 
ation.
5. Make timely, informed decisions.
Figure 6. Five Steps to Cost Containment
The approach for NLS cost containment is an 
evolutionary process starting with program defi­ 
nition and continuing through design, develop­ 
ment and operations. Cost containment can best 
be achieved through a systematic approach for 
establishing meaningful and achievable techni­ 
cal, schedule, and cost baselines and the effective 
integration and implementation of this program.
The NLS cost containment system is obviously 
considerably more involved than can be detailed 
in this short paper. Many on-line, existing 
mangement systems would be utilized, although 
in a more coupled and dynamic manner; several 
new systems would be introduced; more empha­ 
sis would be placed on cost and schedule estimat­ 
ing; techniques such as risk assessments, trend 
and variance analyses, action tracking and inde­ 
pendent evaluations would be used to a greater 
degree; and fall-back and alternate solutions 
would be developed ahead of any need. In 
summary fashion, the five steps to achieve the 
NLS cost containment goal are explained below.
(1) Establish the baseline program 
The crucial program definition work cited earlier 
must be done for NLS. Requirements definition 
and preliminary design work must establish a 
baseline which (1) supports user needs and (2) is
operability focused. Critics of NLS would say 
that neither of these keystones are presently in 
place. Now is the time to focus on these two areas 
in sufficient detail to allow the program to move 
through what has almost become a "go-no go" 
gate. This baseline provides the basis for detailed 
and realistic schedule and cost estimates. Obvi­ 
ously this is an iterative task with many trades 
performed to insure that NLS requirements are 
cost optimized. Appropriate design margins 
must be included and the operations and user 
impacts of requirements and preliminary design 
work must be given the highest priority. Cost 
analysts and designers must work closely to­ 
gether in a proactive environment. Mission 
success should continue to be the primary em­ 
phasis, but with a proper balance of schedule and 
cost considerations. Contingency plans should 
be developed at the outset for each program 
element that would allow for fall-back positions 
in the event technical problems or budgetary 
ceilings are encountered that impact established 
technical, schedule or cost baselines.
(2) Establish cost targets and contingencies 
A tailored design-to-cost approach should be 
implemented where specific cost goals are as­ 
signed, ownership assumed, designs traded and 
cost maintained within these target values while 
still meeting technical requirements. Adequate 
cost reserves should be established and used 
very judicially. For the most part, cost increases 
in one area must be offset by reductions in other 
areas. A concerted effort should be made to 
instill in all NLS participants the idea that the 
challenge of cost containment can be met. Ap­ 
propriate rewards and incentives would have to 
be incorporated at all levels to motivate partici­ 
pants. Education and training programs would 
be required to influence, or perhaps even change, 
individual mind-sets in order to achieve the de­ 
sired results.
(3) Establish cost containment management 
systems, controls and reporting requirements 
Program management processes, tools and tech­ 
niques that are currently being used would have
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to be augmented with new and innovative ideas. 
In this enlightened age it is now possible to 
develop interactive cost, technical and schedule 
reporting, planning, tracking and control man­ 
agement systems complete with projected alter­ 
natives and options and their associated risks 
and costs. Problems could thus be identified and 
fixed early before they create "show stoppers". 
Likewise, resources could be allocated to the 
choke points and technical and management tal­ 
ent directed to the high priority tasks.
(4) Perform tracking, analyses, assessment 
and evaluations.
Cost containment cannot be accomplished from 
tracking and statusing alone. Nor can it be ac­ 
complished if cost, technical and schedule are 
dealt with as individual entities. This step pro­ 
vides the data and recommendations used for 
NLS program decisions and problem resolutions.
The program control tools, procedures and pro­ 
cesses, cost estimating models, and the program 
status and tracking system would be used to 
manage the NLS program, identify potential prob­ 
lems and to develop alternative approaches. The 
baseline would be in the form of a logic network 
model, resourced, time phased and risk quanti­ 
fied. Individual nodes with the greatest risk 
would be analyzed for alternative approaches to 
eliminate or abate risk. Development of alterna­ 
tive approaches would be a continuous process. 
Network modeling and simulations would re­ 
veal areas of greatest risk to cost and schedule. In 
addition, trend analyses would reveal unfavor­ 
able cost or schedule trends which would be 
evaluated. Potential problems would also be 
identified from such sources as program reviews 
and program documentation or from the pro­ 
gram status tracking effort. From these, alterna­ 
tive approaches would be developed and iter­ 
ated until the most suitable approach is attained 
within cost containment consideration. Of course, 
the key to identifying alternative approaches lies 
not in the automated system or model but in the 
"human element"; the ability of the engineer/ 
analyst to identify those areas where risk may be
excessive and to formulate alternative solutions.
(5) Make timely, informed decisions. 
Containing cost while maintaining program con­ 
tinuity is a difficult undertaking. However, deci­ 
sion making when supported by timely and ac­ 
curate data, trades studies, and risk analyses as 
described above, would become a far less haz- 
ardous( and sometimes, haphazardous) en­ 
deavor. It still would require experience, com­ 
mon sense, management and technical judge­ 
ment — and the ability to say "no" to good ideas 
and proposals if they exceed the program's re­ 
quirements or costs. Given these attributes, plus 
immediate access to valid, timely and concise 
data, NLS technical and management personnel 
can provide this nation a needed and cost effec­ 
tive new launch system.
BOTTOM LINE
NLS must take full advantage of the "age of 
information" in which we live and use this infor­ 
mation to plan, to execute and, if necessary, to 
change. NLS must begin with well-grounded 
requirements which are consistent with user 
needs and operability considerations optimized 
to acceptable low cost solutions. NLS must stay 
the course with cost, technical and schedule in­ 
terlocked and armed with good data to support 
every decision.
Cost containment has never been easy. Cost 
containment will never be very easy. But cost 
containment within acceptable limits is achievable 
with good data, good tools, good people and determi­ 
nation.
The views and opinions expressed by the 
author in this paper are his own and are based 
on his 30 years of experience in aerospace 
cost estimating and analysis. They do not 
necessarily reflect any official position of 
ARI, USBI, NASA or the U.S. Air Force.
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